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NOTES
INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSIONARY
CLAUSES: THE QUESTION OF AMBIGUITY
INTRODUCTION
"Who pays" is a question of concern to all of the parties in an insur-
ance claim. Some policies,2 such as those providing health insurance, in-
demnify the policyholders for the cost of injuries or illnesses which they
personally suffer.8 Other policies, such as those providing liability insur-
ance, idemnify policyholders for the cost of injuries to third parties when
the policyholder is responsible for those injuries.' The goal of either type of
indemnification is the same: to use insurance benefits to make the aggrieved
party whole." Thus, the frequent answer to the "who pays" question is the
1. Two commentators define insurance as follows:
Insurance, other than that of life and accident where the result is death, is a contract
of indemnity by which is meant that the party insured is entitled to compensation for
such loss as has been occasioned by the perils insured against, the right to recover being
commensurate with the loss sustained, or with the amount specified, as in cases of life
insurance and valued polices.
I G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:9 (2d ed. 1959).
"Insurance is an arrangement for transferring and distributing risk. It is an arrangement
under which one (called an insurer) contracts to do something that is of value to another
(usually called an insured but sometimes called a beneficiary) upon the occurrence of a speci-
fied harmful contingency."
R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 1.2(a) (1971).
2. Insurance contracts are either liability policies or indemnity policies, depending on the
intent of the parties. The primary difference between the two is when the cause of action
occurs. Under a liability policy, the cause of action accrues when liability attaches. Under an
indemnity policy, the cause of action does not accrue until the liability has been discharged.
6B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4261 (1962). The scope of this note is
limited to liability policies.
3. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 3.1(a).
4. The most common forms of liability insurance are the automobile policy, providing
coverage for losses arising from the use of an automobile; the comprehensive liability policy,
providing coverage for risks not associated with automobiles; the fire policy or homeowner's
policy, covering home and family risks; and the owner's, landlord's, and tenant's policy, cover-
ing risks of certain commercial enterprises. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commis-
sion of Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969).
5. See I G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 1:2.
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insurer, either because it has a legal duty to do so or because public policy
favors compensating a victim by turning to the party with the "deep
pocket." 6
The "pocket" into which the insurance company reaches to settle a
claim contains the premiums paid by its insured.7 Policyholders, by
purchasing insurance policies, transfer a particular risk to the insurance
company.8 The insurance company, in turn, spreads its losses by requiring
policyholders to pay a portion of the total expected losses in the form of
premiums.9 If the policyholder is to collect, he must demonstrate, at a mini-
mum, that he suffered a loss and that the cause of the loss was beyond his
control.10 In this manner, insurance accomplishes its contractual goal of in-
demnification by spreading the risk of fortuitous economic loss throughout a
group of policyholders.1
The loss protection provided by any insurance policy is not without
limits. 2 For example, liability insurers,"3 like individuals, have the contrac-
tual right to place limits on their obligations as long as the limitations are
against neither statutory provisions nor public policy."' To define the scope
of coverage provided by the policy, and, in particular, by its limitations,
insurance policies include conditions, definitions, and exclusions.", Through
these contractual provisions, insurance companies place boundaries on the
coverage their policies provide."
If these boundaries are not clearly understood by all the parties, a dis-
pute may arise when the insured files a claim, and the courts may be asked
to resolve any questions of coverage. One area of liability coverage in which
courts have become involved is in the interpretation of an intentional injury
exclusionary clause which excludes from coverage intentional acts of the
insured resulting in bodily injury or property damage.1 7 Jurisdictions are
6. Kennedy, The Continuing Search for a Deeper Pocket, 25 Ras GESTAE 704 (1982).
7. See Schmit, Insurance Versus Indemnification: An Argument for Stare Decisis, 34
DEF. L.J. 125 (1985).
8. King, The Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New Solution to an Old Dilemma, 16
WAKE FoREST L. REV. 345, 358 (1980).
9. Schmit, supra note 7, at 126.
10. King, supra note 8, at 358.
11. King, supra note 8, at 357-58.
12. See 6B J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4255.
13. Liability insurance benefits two parties: the insured, by allowing him to substitute a
"present certain" payment for the risk of future losses suffered by others, and the public at
large, by assuring that financial compensation will be available if a person is injured under
circumstances for which another person is found liable. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 72 (1982).
14. 6B J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4255.
15. Schmit, supra note 7, at 131.
16. Schmit, supra note 7, at 131.
17. See infra text accompanying note 23.
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split on how the exclusionary clause is to be interpreted with some holding
that it is ambiguous and others that it is not. 8 If the exclusionary clause is
interpreted as being ambiguous, under basic tenets of contract law it will be
construed against the party which drafted the contract, i.e., the insurance
company which, consequently, must provide coverage for the intentional
act. The two primary factors considered by the courts have been the lan-
guage of the clause' 9 and the intent of the insured.20 How the courts inter-
pret the clause determines whether the insured is entitled to coverage under
the terms of the policy or whether he forfeits his right to coverage when he
commits an intentional act resulting in an injury to a third party.2' But the
court's interpretation also may determine whether the injured party is to be
compensated at all, particularly if the insured is judgment proof.2" The de-
sire of the courts to compensate the injured party may take precedence over
an analysis of the policy according to tenets of contract law.2"
This note will demonstrate that consonant with contract law and puni-
tive damages theory, an intentional injury exclusionary clause in a liability
policy should be interpreted as being unambiguous.2 4 To accomplish this
purpose, the note will examine the approaches taken by jurisdictions in de-
termining whether the clause is ambiguous and the influence of contract
law on those decisions.23 The theory of punitive damages and the impact of
court decisions assessing punitive damages against insurers for the actions
of their insureds will then be examined.26 Finally, the note will suggest
guidelines for the courts to follow when deciding whether an intentional
18. Courts in California, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Min-
nesota, and New York have ruled that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is inherently
ambiguous. Courts in Arizona, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Mon-
tana, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin have taken the position that inten-
tional injury exclusionary clauses are not ambiguous. Courts in Minnesota and Illinois have
reached both conclusions. Courts in other states reach conclusions on the ambiguity of the
clause on a case-by-case basis. See Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of
Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31
A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984).
19. The courts have looked to whether the language is clear and plain, lacking obscurity
and ambiguity. See infra text accompanying notes 45-73.
20. Of specific interest to the courts has been not only whether the insured's act was
intentional but also whether the resulting harm or injury was intentional. See infra text ac-
companying notes 74-110.
21. Snodgrass v. Baize, 405 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). See also II G. Couc",
supra note 1, at § 44:324.
22. "Liability insurance was initially designed to protect an insured against loss caused
by his tort liability to a third person. . . . But liability insurance has come to be used openly
and extensively as a device for insuring compensation to victims." R. KEETON, supra note 1, at
§ 4.8(a).
23. R. KEETON, supra note I, at § 4.8(a).
24. See infra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 118-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 168-89 and accompanying text.
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injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous.2 7
INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES
All parties in a liability insurance policy dispute have a stake in the
court's decision as to whether an intentional injury exclusionary clause", is
ambiguous. The insurance company, which believes it is being asked to pay
an unjustified claim, argues that the clause is not ambiguous. But the in-
sured, who believes he is entitled to protection under the terms of his policy
and who fears his acts may not be covered, argues that the clause is ambig-
uous. The third party in the dispute, the injured person who may find that
the harm was caused by a judgment-proof defendant and who believes that
he is entitled to compensation, also argues that the clause is ambiguous.
One question is common to all three positions: Who pays under the
contract?
Contractual Theories of Analysis
Two contractual theories underlie the search of the injured party for
compensation. The first focuses on the unequal bargaining positions of the
27. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
28. The current standard liability policy came into use in 1966 with further revisions in
1973 by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau. Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy and
Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. B. 257, 258 (1978). For examples of standard policy
forms see generally R. KEETON, supra note I. The central clause of the insuring agreement
reads, "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of. . . bodily injury or . . .property dam-
ages to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence." The intentional injury exclu-
sionary clause defines "occurence" as an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured. The 1973 revisions did not represent a change in philoso-
phy; instead, the revisions were an attempt to clarify ambiguities by putting terms such as
"accident," "intended," and "expected" in a "more intelligible verbal framework." Farbstein
& Stillman, supra note 4, at 1236-37. Among the problems the drafters hoped to clarify was
whether the happening of the accident should be viewed from the standpoint of the insured or
of the victim. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property
Damage Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability
Policy, 19 FORUM 513, 521-24 (1984). The drafters also hoped to clarify whether a less am-
biguous word could be substituted for accident (explaining the selection of "occurrence") and
whether a distinction could be made between harm brought about and harm contemplated.
Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1220, 1237. Appleman gives two reasons to justify the
insertion of the intentional injury exclusionary clause in insurance policies. See 7A J. AP-
PLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4492.01. First, the insurer's ability to set rates and to supply
coverage depends on policyholders not controlling risks, and, second, insertion of the clause
prohibits wrongdoers from shifting the responsibility for the consequences of their acts. 7A J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4492.01.
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insurance company and the person purchasing insurance coverage.29 Insur-
ance policies are generally regarded as contracts of adhesion"0 with the typ-
ical purchaser buying a "packaged product"3' on a "take it or leave it"
basis.32 Because the policy is a contract of adhesion, any ambiguities will be
construed in favor of the insured.3"
The second theory of compensation looks to the parties to the con-
tract.8 4 The insurance policy is an agreement between the insurer and the
insured.35 Without a specific contract or statutory provision, an injured
third party has no contractual rights against the insurer.3 6 The injured
party's right to recover is determined by the terms of the contract, 1 and, if
a claimant is to recover, he must appear to be covered by the policy.3 8 The
traditional rule is that the injured person, who is not a party to the con-
tract, only has a right of action against the insured.3 ' The insurance com-
29. Comment, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality and Practi-
cality, 9 CuM. L. REV. 487, 497 (1978).
30. Insurance policies are regarded as contracts of adhesion because insurers offer only a
limited range of forms, and the purchaser, if he wants insurance, must select one of these
forms. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 2.10(b)(7). The insurer and the purchaser do not follow
the contract model of two individuals reaching an agreement by bargaining because the pur-
chaser has no real choice. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.3 (2d ed.
1977).
31. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 2.11 (a). Much of the standardization of policy forms
is the result of cooperation among insurance companies. The first nationally standardized lia-
bility policy came into use in 1935. Standardized policies are both beneficial and detrimental
to individuals, offering economic savings and making risk distribution feasible, but at the same
time making adjustment of the policy to individual needs more difficult. Standardization is
generally controlled by state statutes regulating method and degree. Id.
32. See Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 483 P.2d 1072 (1971).
The terms of today's standard insurance policy are predetermined by the insurance
carrier itself and, long in advance of the individual insurance sale, those terms have been
incorporated into the insurance package presented to the prospective buyer. The free give
and take of the open market place does not prevail in the insurance industry. The buyer's
freedom of choice in selecting a policy is severely limited; if he desires casualty insurance
he must normally accept the printed policy with the usual printed provisions - else he can
leave it.
Id. at 80, 483 P.2d at 1074-75.
33. 12 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44A:3. "Since the insurer chose the form of con-
tract, the ambiguities will be construed against it." Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F.
Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D. Ind. 1978). Reasons advanced by the insured that the intentional
injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous and those by the insurer that it is not are discussed
infra text accompanying notes 50-117.
34. See 11 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:4.
35. See II G. COUCH, supra note i, at § 44:4.
36. See 11 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:4.
37. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4813.
38. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4813.
39. 1i G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:324. Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984), illustrates application of this rule. Cromer brought a negligence action against
Sefton who had been convicted of battery after assaulting Cromer. In a separate declaratory
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pany owes no duty to a noninsured or to a third party plaintiff.'0 If, in a
tort claim, the court finds that the insured is liable for injuries to a third
party, the third party may bring suit against the insurer to collect dam-
ages.4 ' As such, the injured third party may take direct action against the
insurer only after the insured's obligation to pay has been resolved in a tort
action.' 2
If the injured party decides to proceed in a tort action against the in-
sured, the insured must give proper notice to the insurance company."a The
insurance company then decides whether to pay the claim or to defend the
action.44 If the insurance company believes that the injury was intentionally
caused by the insured and, therefore, is within the purview of the inten-
tional injury exclusionary clause, the company will claim that it has no duty
to defend the tort action since the claim is not covered by the policy.45 The
judgment, Sefton's insurer, Westfield Insurance Co., had been ordered to defend Sefton in the
negligence action and to assume liability for any negligent acts. Westfield then filed a motion
for substitution in Cromer's action against Sefton. The trial court granted the motion which
allowed the insurer to be joined with defendant Sefton. Westfield resubmitted a motion for
summary judgment filed earlier for Sefton. The trial court granted the motion, and Cromer
appealed.
The appellate court, with what it described as "great difficulty," identified seven issues
raised on appeal, including whether the trial court erred in permitting Westfield to intervene in
the personal injury action. Ruling that the trial court erred by forcing the plaintiff to "become
embroiled" in a matter in which she did not yet have an interest, the appellate court reiterated
that no duty or fiduciary relationship runs from the insurer to the injured plaintiff. The court
repeated its position that a tort action on a contract theory by an injured third party directly
against the liability carrier is inappropriate, but that a successful personal injury plaintiff can
bring an action against a liability carrier if it refuses to honor its contract. Id.
The principal reason for barring direct action against the insurer by the injured third
party is to prevent jury prejudice against the insurer in the underlying tort action. Courts in
some states (West Virginia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylva-
nia) have modified the rule on the theory that the insurance policy is a contract to benefit the
injured third party. Other states (Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) allow direct action
against an insurer under certain circumstances, such as when the insured is insolvent. See
generally II G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:324; R. KEETON, supra note I, at § 7.11.
40. See Cromer, 471 N.E.2d at 700, discussed supra note 39; 11 G. COUCH, supra note
1, at § 44:324.
41. See II G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:324.
42. See II G. COUCH, supra note I, at § 44:324.
43. See generally 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1323 (1964).
44. Id.
45. The standard liability insurance policy defines two distinct duties of an insurer if its
insured is found liable: the duty to defend and the duty to pay. The duty to defend is included
in the policy langauge in which the insurer promises "to defend any suit alleging such bodily
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of the
policy, even if any allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent." Farbstein &
Stillman, supra note 4, at 1228. The insurer must defend if the act of the insured falls within
the provisions of the policy. P. MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILITY: DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE INSURER § 2.03 (2d ed. 1982). "The duty to defend arises whenever there is a potential
of liability under the policy." Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 718, 719-20,
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insurer's interests, at this point, have come in conflict with those of the
insured.4
6
At the heart of the conflict is whether the intentional injury exclusion-
647 P.2d 1361, 1363 (1982). The duty to defend is triggered when the insured notifies the
insurer of an act which may be covered by the policy. The insurer's duty to pay is not trig-
gered until the insured is obligated to pay. Poust, Insurers' Tender to Insureds of Right to
Choose Counsel at Insurer's Expense. When Need This be Done? 51 INS. CouNs. J. 563, 565
(1984).
46. Ingram, Conflicts of Interest in the Insurer's Duty to Defend in Illinois, 17 J. MAR
L. REV. 379, 380 (1984). Conflicts of interest are most likely to occur when the damages
sought exceed the policy limits, when the insured and insurer are in conflict as to whether the
claim is covered, and when the insurer has a defense to his liability. Id. When the insurer
believes it is not obligated to defend, its options are to deny liability and to refuse to defend
the claim against the insured; to defend the claim under a reservation of rights under the
policy; to defend the claim without reservation of rights thereby waiving any policy defenses;
or to seek a declaratory judgment prior to the third party's action or subsequent to the judg-
ment therein. Id. at 381-82. The fourth option may be the most frequently used device to
resolve a conflict of interest. As the court noted in Group Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Morelli, I II
Mich. App. 510, 515, 314 N.W.2d 672, 675 (1981), "[Olur literature abounds with case law
where the insured or insurer has sought a declaratory action to determine disputed issues of
coverage."
In Snodgrass v. Baize, 405 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), insurer, perceiving a conflict
of interest in a civil tort suit brought by an injured third party against its insured, paid the fees
of its insured's personal attorney rather than defend the suit itself. The jury found for the
injured third party, who then filed a motion for proceedings supplemental against the insurer
and the insured. The insurer defended on the ground that the injury was intentional and, thus,
excluded from coverage. The trial court agreed. In affirming the trial court's finding, the court
of appeals observed that the insurer's actions, described in detail, were "a model to be followed
in such situations." Id. at 53.
Resolving the conflict of interest is important to the insurer because, if it makes the wrong
choice, it can be sued for breach of contract for failure to defend. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note
2, at § 4686. The insurer's refusal to defend makes it liable for any damages the insured
sustained because of the breach of contract. Id. at § 4689. In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Arm-
strong, 384 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), modified 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982), an in-
sured brought a breach of contract suit against her insurer, charging it with deceitful and
fraudulent conduct because of its refusal to settle a claim. The trial court, in a verdict upheld
by the court of appeals, awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The court of ap-
peals in its 1979 ruling observed that while as a general rule punitive damages were not
awarded in contract actions, an exception could be made "where the conduct of the party, in
breaching a contract, independently establishes the elements of a common law tort." Id. at
618. The court of appeals held the jury "reasonably could have found elements of fraud, mal-
ice, gross negligence or oppression mingled with the breach of contract." Id. However, in 1982
the Indiana Supreme Court modified the ruling when it adopted the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard for the awarding of punitive damages. It then vacated the earlier award of
punitive damages as unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 358-65 (Ind. 1982). See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES §§ 4.2, 4.4(c); Kornblum, Extra-Contract Actions Against Insurers: What's Ahead in
the Eighties? 19 FORUM 58 (1983); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592
P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979)
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ary clause is ambiguous.47 In resolving this question courts generally look to
two areas: the langauge of the clause and the intent of the insured."8 But
identical questions of language and intent have not produced identical
answers.
49
Language of the Clause
Whether the final ruling is that the language of the intentional injury
exclusionary clause is ambiguous or free from ambiguity, the courts begin
their analysis with the wording of the policy itself." The insured, seeking to
prove that the clause is ambiguous, will argue that the wording is open to
more than one interpretation. 1 Conversely, the insurer will argue that the
clause lacks ambiguity. In determining whether the clause is ambiguous,
courts have taken three positions: that the clause's ambiguity depends on
the particular factual situations of the case; that the clause is inherently
ambiguous; or that the clause is per se free from ambiguity.52
Courts in those jurisdictions ruling that an intentional injury exclusion-
ary clause is free from ambiguity and that its language is plain and clear
have done so with little difficulty. The court in Pachucki v. Republic Ins.
Co. used an objective standard to find the clause not ambiguous.53 The suit
involved an action under a homeowner's insurance policy in which a third
party was injured in an office "greening pin war" which the court compared
to shooting paper clips with rubber bands." The court ruled the language of
the intentional tort exclusion was not ambiguous because "a reasonable per-
son in the position of the insured would interpret the policy language as
specifically applying only to injuries intentionally caused." 55
47. See generally Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or
Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions Considering Same Question as Evidence that Particular
Clause of Insurance Policy is Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1253 (1981). "Language in contract
is 'ambiguous' when it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense. Test
for determining whether a contract is 'ambiguous' is whether reasonable persons would find
the contract subject to more than one interpretation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (5th ed.
1983).
48. Annotation, supra note 18, at 972.
49. Annotation, supra note 18, at 972.
50. Annotation, supra note 18, at 972.
51. See generally 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 291 (1984).
52. Annotation, supra note 18, at 957. Scope of this note will be limited to states finding
that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous or free from ambiguity.
53. 89 Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979). The plaintiff in Pachucki brought suit to
recover damages under a homeowner's liability policy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's finding that plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the policy since the in-
sureds knew that some harm could be caused. Id. at 713-14, 278 N.W.2d at 903-04.
54. Id. at 705, 278 N.W.2d at 899.
55. Id. at 708, 278 N.W.2d at 901.
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Other courts have looked to the wording of the clause itself to hold
that it is free from ambiguity. One approach has been to look to the "plain,
ordinary and popular" meaning of the words to find the clause free from
ambiguity.56 A similar "plain meaning" approach has been to hold that the
clause can be given only one reasonable interpretation."7
Another approach taken by state courts ruling that an intentional in-
jury exclusionary clause is free from ambiguity has been to emphasize the
result of the insured's actions. These courts dispense with an analysis of the
language of the clause and begin their reasoning with a finding of no ambi-
guity.58 They further reason that because the clause is unambiguous, the
effect of its application is to exclude from coverage intentional acts of the
insured that result in harm to a third party.59 Courts in Arizona,6" Arkan-
sas,6 the District of Columbia,6 2 and Louisiana 63 have also utilized the
56. "Such a construction of the insurance policy is not strained or forced, but rather is
an interpretation of the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of the words used by the insurer
in defining the coverage extended. It should be interpreted in that sense." Northwestern Nat'l
Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 182 Mont. 448, 456, 597 P.2d 720, 724 (1979). In Phalen, the insurer
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine policy coverage after the insurer reserved
rights in an action involving the insured's son. The son was defendant in a civil action brought
by a man whom the son assaulted. The son pleaded guilty to a felony charge of aggravated
assault. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The Montana
Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the declaratory judgment
action. Id. at 462, 597 P.2d at 728.
57. "Such words are clear and unambiguous and capable of only one reasonable inter-
pretation." Continental Casualty Co. v. Parker, 161 Ga. App. 614, 616, 288 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1982). The insurer filed a motion for declaratory judgment to resolve coverage questions after
a third party, who had been involved in an altercation with the insured, filed suit against the
insured. The insurer contended that because the insured's act was intentional it was not cov-
ered by the policy. The lower court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 618, 288 S.E.2d at 780.
58. E.g., "There is no ambiguity in the sentence .... The sentence obviously means
that the policy is excluding from coverage injury caused by the insured's intentional acts, de-
termining whether the act is intentional from the insured's point of view." Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. 461, 463, 303 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1983). The court of appeals
in Mauldin affirmed the lower court's ruling that the policy did not provide coverage for the
shooting in a suit arising out of the efforts of a murder victim's estate to collect from a home-
owner's insurance policy. Id.
59. Id.
60. "The exclusion here is unambiguous. By its language it excludes from coverage the
intentional acts of the insured which result in injury. It follows that if the injury results from
the natural and probable consequences of the intentional act, the subjective intent of the actor
is simply immaterial - the exclusion applies." Steinmetz v. Nat'l Ins. Co., 121 Ariz. 268, 271,
589 P.2d 911, 914 (1979).
61. "The clear language of the policy exclusion itself.., states there is no coverage for
injury that is expected or intended." Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 272, 620
S.W.2d 260, 262 (1981).
62. "However, the Court cannot find that this exclusion is in any way ambiguous. The
language, an accident 'neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured,'
means simply that if Mr. Walburn either intended to do serious bodily injury to 'Corky' Nails
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"end-result" reasoning.
Nevertheless, other courts, reading and interpreting the same clause,
have held its language to be ambiguous and subject to more than one mean-
ing. For example, in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., a suit brought by an insured
against his insurer for failure to defend in a third party suit resulting from
an alleged assault, the court used doctrines of contract law to decide that
the language of the clause was ambiguous."' The Gray court based its anal-
ysis on an insurance policy being a contract of adhesion, 65 and held that the
meaning of the contact should be one which the insured would "reasonably
expect."" Notice of noncoverage should therefore be "conspicuous, plain,
and clear.167 The court further held that the insurer's duty to the insured
could have been clarified by the use of plain English, by a more conspicuous
placement of the clause, and by the use of capital letters to call attention to
the clause."
Concern about the clarity of policy langauge led courts in Indiana"
and Kansas7 0 to rule that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is am-
biguous. Factors considered by the courts were the adhesion nature of the
policy contract, the clarity of the langauge of the policy clause, and the
expectations of the insured.7 1 Both the Indiana and Kansas courts, like the
Wisconsin court in Pachucki,72 applied an objective standard to decide
whether the clause was ambiguous. But, while in Pachucki that test re-
sulted in a finding of no ambiguity,"3 the courts in Kansas and Indiana
reached another conclusion using the same standard on the same lan-
guage.7 4 According to the Kansas and Indiana courts, the intentional injury
or expected such a result from his action, then there is no coverage." Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Walburn, 378 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying District of Columbia law).
63. "The policy plainly, simply and unequivocally states that it does not cover personal
liability arising from a bodily injury either expected or intended by the insured." Kipp v.
Hurdle, 307 So. 2d 125, 129 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
64. 65 Cal. 3d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
65. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 271, 419 P.2d at 172, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
68. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
69. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 384 N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979),
modified, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982).
70. Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 83, 483 P.2d 1072, 1076
(1971).
71. "Unclear and obscure clauses in a policy of insurance should not be permitted to
defeat the coverage which is reasonably to be expected by the insured." Gowing, 207 Kan. at
81, 483 P.2d at 1075.
72. Pachucki, 89 Wis. 2d at 703, 278 N.W.2d at 898.
73. Id. at 708, 278 N.W.2d at 901.
74. "An insurance contract is ambiguous if reasonably intelligent men, upon reading the
contract, would honestly differ as to its meaning." Armstrong, 384 N.E.2d at 613. "[Tlhe test
is not what the insurer intends the printed words of the policy to mean, but rather what a
[Vol. 21
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exclusionary clause failed the objective test because different conclusions
could be reached as to the clause's meaning. 75 Therefore, both courts held
that the clause was ambiguous.71
INTENT OF THE INSURED
A second area typically examined by the courts in determining
whether the intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous is the intent
of the insured." The argument most often advanced by the insured is that
he intended only minor bodily contact, not the resulting injury. 78 If he in-
tentionally caused the injury, the intentional injury exclusionary clause is
triggered.7 9 Once the clause is triggered, the policy will not cover the in-
sured, and the insurance company has no duty to defend him or to pay the
claim. 80 However, if the injury was caused by accident, 81 the insurance
reasonable person placed in the position of the insured would have understood the words to
mean." Gowing, 207 Kan. at 82, 483 P.2d at 1076.
75. Gowing, 207 Kan. at 82, 483 P.2d at 1076; Armstrong, 384 N.E.2d at 613.
76. Id.
77. The intentional injury exclusionary clause refers to "bodily injury ... neither ex-
pected or intended from the standpoint of the insured." See infra notes 190-200 and accompa-
nying text. When deciding if an act is intended, courts look to the intent of the insured.
78. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1234. Other positions which the insured may
take are that his act was privileged and, therefore, not wrongful; that the injury was unin-
tended and that he was not negligent nor at fault; or that he did not commit the act. Id. at
1239.
79. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1222.
80. See generally 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 291 (1984).
81. Some insureds, in order to obtain coverage for their acts, have apparently hoped the
court would apply a liberal definition of "intent" to find their acts were accidental. For exam-
ple, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. 461, 303 S.E.2d 214 (1983), the
insured fired a gun into a car several times, intending to kill his wife. Instead, he killed her
female companion. The administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a wrongful death
action against the insured. The insured argued that he should be covered under his home-
owner's liability policy since his intent was to kill his wife, not her companion. The court
denied coverage, holding that the insured "obviously knew it was probable that he would hit
Pugh when he fired four or five shots into her moving car." Id. at 463, 303 S.E.2d at 217.
In Horde v. Foucha, 396 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 1981), an injured third party brought
suit against an insured and the insurer to recover under a homeowner's liability policy. The
insured shot the injured party after chasing him and firing at him three or four times with a
rifle. The court denied coverage, ruling that it "strains our credulity to suppose that this de-
fendant who fired on an unarmed plaintiff several times and finally struck him ...did not
intend to hurt him." Id. at 443. The courts showed a similar skeptical approach to allegedly
accidental shootings in Kermans v. Pendleton, 62 Mich. App. 576, 233 N.W.2d 658 (1975) in
which the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that "plaintiffs' distinction between
intended felonious acts and unintended felonious results was a distinction without a difference"
and denied coverage. Id. at 579-80, 233 N.W.2d at 660. In Marines v. Hinrichs, 357 So. 2d
1358 (La. Ct. App. 1978) in which the court of appeals noted that plaintiff's memory loss was
possibly "motivated by her desire to reach a more solvent defendant" and denied coverage. Id.
at 1359-60. Finally, in Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 718, 721, 647 P.2d
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company has a duty to defend and, depending on the outcome of the suit, to
compensate the victim.82 The court must decide whether the insured wanted
to cause the consequences of his act and whether a reasonable person would
believe those consequences would result from his act;83 whether the insured
desired to harm the plaintiff;84 and whether the insured's intent can be de-
termined by the nature of his act.85 In seeking an answer, courts typically
will not hesitate to look to the insured's subjective intent.88
An intentional injury exclusionary clause excludes from coverage those
acts which were intentionally caused by the insured and which resulted in
injury to a third party. The definition of intent thus becomes crucial to
determining whether an insured's acts fall within policy provisions. Just as
they are split on determining whether the language of the intentional injury
exclusionary clause is ambiguous, courts are split on how to define intent.
A starting point for jurisdictions ruling that the intentional injury ex-
clusionary clause is free from ambiguity is the definition of intent. The ter-
minology the courts have adopted in defining intent has its roots in tort law
and can be traced to the Restatement of Torts87 and Prosser's Law of
Torts. 8  Key elements of both definitions are the desire of the actor to cause
the consequences of his act and his understanding or belief that certain
consequences will probably follow from his act.89 Jurisdictions defining in-
tent have adopted similar wording. 90
1361, 1364 (1982), the court held "to say that the act of aiming and firing the gun was
intentional, but the injury was not, draws too fine a distinction" and denied coverage.
82. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1228.
83. II G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:289.
84. 11 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:289.
85. Annotation, supra note 47, at 1253.
86. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1237.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977).
88. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (5th ed. 1984).
89. The Restatement refers to the actor who "desires to cause the consequences of his
act, or . . . believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 87, at § 8A. Prosser's definition contains the phrasing "to those conse-
quences that are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to
follow what he does." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 88, at § 8.
90. In Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Ariz. 150, 153, 579 P.2d 1120, 1122-23 (1978),
the court affirmed a ruling of the trial court that a homeowner's liability policy did not cover a
shooting. The court of appeals affirmed its earlier ruling that it recognized some acts were so
certain to cause a particular kind of harm that the person who performed the act must have
intended the harm. In Cavanagh v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 20 Ariz. App. 38, 46, 509 P.2d
1075, 1082 (1973), an action to resolve insurance coverage following a homicide, the court of
appeals ruled, "The inference that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his
act is founded upon a logical mental process, that when a person voluntarily commits an act he
usually intends the natural consequences thereof." In Tobin v. Williams, 396 So. 2d 562, 565
(La. Ct. App. 1981), a third party injured in a shooting incident brought suit against the
insured and insurer. The trial court ruled against the insured but dismissed the action against
[Vol. 21
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1987], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/6
EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES
After defining intent, courts must decide how to apply the definition.
In Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Phalen, in a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether an insured's assault of a third party was cov-
ered by a homeowner's policy, the court developed a two-fold test to deter-
mine applicability of the intentional injury exclusionary clause.9 The court
asked if the act was intended and if the injury was foreseen by the in-
sured. 92 Applying the test, the court concluded that the act was intended
and that the insured should have foreseen the resulting injury. Because the
insured demonstrated the requisite intent, the clause precluded coverage.9"
The issue before the Phalen court was whether the word "intent" in
the exclusionary clause referred to the insured's intent to act or the intent
to do harm. 94 The insured argued that because the clause was not clear in
its application, it was ambiguous and should be construed in his favor.95
The Phalen court found that the clause was unambiguous.96 The courts in
Pachucki "' and Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mauldin" also considered
whether an intent to act meant an intent to harm. The Pachucki court,
ruling that the clause was not ambiguous, upheld the trial court's finding
that the intent to inflict injury could be inferred from the defendant's inten-
tional acts.99 Similarly, the Mauldin court held that the clause disallowed
coverage for bodily injury resulting from the insured's intentional acts.100
The court in Cavanagh v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. concisely summarized
whether "intended," as used in the clause was ambiguous.' 0' The Cavanagh
court held that if a person voluntarily performs an act, he must intend its
natural consequences.10 2
The definition of intent, however, is not so clear cut for other courts
whose questions about the word's meaning have resulted in rulings that an
intentional injury exclusionary clause is inherently ambiguous. The court in
Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen cited three possible ways of defining the phrase
"caused intentionally."' 0 3 The first possible interpretation provided by the
the insurer. The court of appeals affirmed, supporting the trial court's judgment that the in-
sured intended or expected to injure the third party.
91. 182 Mont. at 457, 597 P.2d at 725.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 459, 597 P.2d at 726.
94. Id. at 456, 597 P.2d at 724.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979).
98. 62 N.C. App. at 461, 303 S.E.2d at 214.
99. Pachucki, 98 Wis. 2d at 712, 278 N.W.2d at 903.
100. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. at 463, 303 S.E.2d at 216.
101. 20 Ariz. App. at 45, 509 P.2d at 1082.
102. Id.
103. 165 Ind. App. 445, 448, 332 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1975). The insured, defendant in a
separate civil suit for assault and battery, brought an action for declaratory judgment against
1987]
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Neilsen court looked to the volition of the insured; if the insured acted in-
tentionally, the resulting injury was intentional. The second interpretation
looked to the result achieved. The question was not whether the act was
intentional but whether the resulting harm was intended. The third possible
interpretation was somewhere between the other two. Under the third defi-
nition, the important factor was whether the insured intended any harm,
not just the harm that resulted. Because of the possible differences in defini-
tion, the Neilsen court ruled that the language was "arguably ambiguous"
and that the court must accept the contract interpretation most favorable to
the insured. 1° 4 The court then held that the policy language excludes cover-
age for insured's intentional acts intended to cause injury.10 5
The definitions suggested by the Neilsen court have provided some
guidance for courts seeking to define intent. The court in Farmers Ins.
Group v. Sessions, hearing a suit brought by an insurer against its insured
and an injured third party to determine applicability of the exclusionary
clause, referred to the three definitions used by the Nielsen court.' °6 The
Sessions court reached the same conclusion as the Nielsen court that the
exclusionary clause was ambiguous.10 7 The Sessions court then held that
the clause would apply if the insurer could show that its insured acted
"willfully, intentionally or maliciously" in causing the injury which re-
sulted."'8 Its remand of the case for factual determination 0 " is indicative of
the case-by-case analysis of intent and of its differing definitions by courts
holding that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous. 1 0
his insurer who refused to defend him in the civil suit. The court of appeals ruled that the
intentional injury exclusionary clause was ambiguous, but it also ruled that under the particu-
lar circumstances of the case to allow coverage would be to rewrite the contract. The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and ruled that judgment should be entered for the
insurer.
104. Id. at 451, 332 N.E.2d at 244.
105. Id. An earlier case, American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn.
1965), foreshadowed the Nielsen ruling. The Saulnier court, hearing a suit brought by an
insurer for declaration of nonliability under a homeowner's policy, ruled that the intentional
injury exclusionary clause was ambiguous because it could be interpreted two ways. In Pa-
trons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981), the court found the insurer
had a duty to defend its insured in a tort action, even though the insured had been criminally
prosecuted for the shooting, because the language of the policy was ambiguous.
106. 100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980).
107. Id. at 916, 607 P.2d at 424.
108. Id. at 918, 607 P.2d at 426.
109. Id.
110. A ruling that the intentional injury clause is ambiguous does not guarantee that the
insurer is obligated to defend. After the court has determined the clause is ambiguous and,
therefore, the policy provisions must be weighted in favor of the insured, the court examines
the factors of the case and decides whether the insurer has a duty to defend. Thus, after the
initial finding that the clause is ambiguous, the court may decide that the insurer has a duty to
defend, as in Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981), or that the
insurer does not have a duty to defend, as in Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 7 Kan.
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These differing interpretations of the intentional injury exclusionary
clause, based on whether it is ambiguous, have made case law difficult to
reconcile.1 ' Applying the doctrine of contra proferentuM, 112 some courts
have taken unambiguous clauses, labeled them ambiguous, and applied
them against insurance companies, thus remaking the contract." 3 In some
states, a developing trend requires the insurance company to pay if the in-
sured did not understand the exclusionary clause, even if it was not ambigu-
ous.""4 These rulings, which have the effect of compensating an injured
third party who under a stricter reading of the clause would not have been
compensated, may be an outgrowth of judicial concern for victims, once
largely ignored.'" Whatever the reasoning, the effect has been to increase
the number of such cases being litigated."6 What has developed since the
insurance industry changed the wording of its policies is an inconsistent
area of case law as courts try to compensate victims and not reward
wrongdoers.I 7
EFFECTS OF RULING THE INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE
TO BE AMBIGUOUS
Judicial interpretation of an intentional injury exclusionary clause as
ambiguous increases compensation for third parties and increases litiga-
App. 718, 647 P.2d 1361 (1982), or Heshelman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 412 N.E.2d
301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Ill. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 705. Kennedy concludes that based on rulings in Neil-
sen, 165 Ind. App. at 445, 332 N.E.2d at 240, and Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brandum, 419 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), Indiana has a three-prong test for an insurer
to successfully invoke the intentional injury exclusionary clause. The insurer must show that
the insured intended to do the act, that he intended to inflict harm, and that he intended to
harm the individual actually harmed.
112. As a general theory of contract interpretation, contra proferentum means that am-
biguities in contracts are interpreted against the draftsman. Kelly, supra note 29, at 497.
113. Kelly, supra note 29, at 498.
114. Pace, In Defense of Policy Exclusions, 24 FOR DEF. 9, 11 (Nov. 1982). Keeton
uses the doctrine of reasonable expectations to explain what he describes as "deviant deci-
sions." When courts apply the doctrine, "[tlhe objectively reasonable expectations of appli-
cants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."
R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 6.3(a). See American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257
(D. Conn. 1965).
115. Crouse, Negligence Liability for the Criminal Acts of Another, 15 J. MAR. L.
REV. 459, 461 (1982). Crouse refers to several areas in which third-party liability is being
tested in the courts, including suits against a bus driver who allows a passenger to be crimi-
nally assaulted, against a landlord when a tenant is attacked, and against a psychologist who
does not warn of a patient's intent to attack a third party.
116. Kennedy, supra note I ll, at 705.
117. Kennedy, supra note I ll, at 705.
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tion.116 But these are not the only effects. Ruling that the clause is ambigu-
ous also contravenes general rules of contract law and undermines the doc-
trine of punitive damages.
Even though an insurance policy is a contract of adhesion,119 courts are
still bound by principles of contract law in their interpretation of policies.20
For example, the court cannot rewrite the contract of the parties.' 2 ' The
court's objective must be to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
parties who negotiated the contract"1 2  and to give "plain, usual ordinary
meaning" to the policy terms.128 Any other interpretation would be a re-
making of the contract. 2 4
Some jurisdictions recognize that an interpretation of the intentional
injury exclusionary clause as ambiguous will result in broadening coverage
of a liability policy. For example, in North Carolina, where the exclusion-
ary clause is viewed as free from ambiguity, the Court of Appeals in
Mauldin held that courts must enforce the contract as written.12 5 The
courts could not rule that the clause was ambiguous in order to impose new
liabilities on the parties by, in effect, rewriting the contract. 2 In Indiana,
where the exclusionary clause is viewed as inherently ambiguous, the Court
of Appeals in Nielsen refused to order the insurer to defend an insured
whose actions fell within the scope of the exclusionary clause because to do
so would be to rewrite the contract.2 7 The Neilsen court also found that the
intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous and generally should be
construed in favor of the insured. 28 However, the court held that the in-
sured's acts fell within the scope of the clause and, therefore, should not be
covered by the policy.120
The balancing of interests undertaken by the Neilsen court is indica-
tive of the type of analysis used by the courts which view an intentional
injury exclusionary clause as ambiguous. In a case-by-case approach, the
118. See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
119. See supra text accompanying note 30.
120. See 12 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44A:2.
121. See 12 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44A:2.
122. Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Ind. 1978). The
Grant court heard a declaratory judgment action brought by a city and individual police of-
ficers to clarify their rights under certain liability policies.
123. Id. at 1366. The court cannot extend the liability of the insurer by implying mean-
ings to terms, nor can it apply a definition that is not customary. See I 1 G. COUCH, supra note
1, at § 44:7.
124. See 11 G. COUCH, supra note 1, at § 44:7.
125. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. 461, 303 S.E.2d 214 (1983).
126. Id. at 463, 303 S.E.2d at 216.
127. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445, 452, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1975).
128. Id. at 451, 332 N.E.2d at 244.
129. Id.
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courts must balance the competing interests of contract law, which prohibit
courts from rewriting the contract, against the insured's belief that he is
entitled to coverage. Attempts by the courts to balance these competing
interests can result in broadened policy coverage.
Interpretation of the intentional injury exclusionary clause as ambigu-
ous also negates the right of a contracting party to limit its liability. 30 The
insurance industry has deemed certain acts, identified as implied exceptions,
beyond the scope of insurance coverage.' Included in the list of implied
exceptions are death by execution for a crime, death by suicide while sane,
inherent vice, "friendly fire," losses caused by the insured's gross negligence
or recklessness, and injuries or losses from intentional torts caused by the
insured.'3 2 Courts will sometimes create an implied exception for a criminal
act, such as assault, depending on the circumstances of the case. 3 3 Two
underlying principles justify the existence of these implied exceptions.'3"
First, insurance contracts do not ordinarily cover losses which occur with
such regularity that they can be considered a cost of doing business.' 38 Sec-
ond, insurance policies usually do not cover losses that are not fortuitous
from the viewpoint of the insured.' 3 6 Put more simply, a person should not
be able to take advantage of his intentional wrongdoing. 
3
7
By holding that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambigu-
ous, courts allow persons to insure themselves against their own intentional
wrongful acts.' 38 A number of cases recognize that the purpose of the inten-
tional injury exclusionary clause is to prevent extending to the insured a
license to commit "wanton and malicious acts."'3 9 If persons can insure
130. 68 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4255.
131. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 5.3.
132. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 5.3. The inherent vice exception ap-
plies to marine insurance and refers to the natural decay of goods resulting from delay caused
by an insured against peril. Id. at § 5.3(c). A friendly fire is one contained in an ordinary place
for a fire in use, such as a stove or furnace. Id. at § 5.3(d).
133. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4685.01. Some commentators argue for a flat
denial of coverage. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 45, at 299. Others contend the better view is
to investigate the circumstances of the claim to determine if the assault could have been an
accident. See 7C J. APPLEMAN supra note 2, at § 4685.01; 11 G. CoucH, supra note 1, at §
44:298. The key question in the analysis of such cases is the intent of the insured. Rynearson,
supra note 28, at 526-27.
134. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 5.3.
135. R. KEETON, supra note i, at § 5.3.
136. R. KEETON, supra note I, at § 5.3.
137. P. MAGARICK, supra note 45, at 287.
138. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at § 5.3.
139. Annotation, supra note 18. See MacDonald v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 210 Or. 395,
411, 311 P.2d 425, 432 (1957) ("If there were any doubt as to the construction to be given to
the policy we would be influenced in favor of that which we have adopted by the decisions
holding that it is contrary to public policy to insure against liability arising directly against the
insured from his own willful and illegal act."); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445,
1987]
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their intentional wrongful acts, they might be inclined to physical violence
or to use excessive force to defend personal and property rights. 4" Insur-
ance for such conduct "might well lead to irresponsibility."'1
4
The argument can be made that persons would commit intentional
torts because they can get insurance. For example, a large number of prop-
erty owners carry insurance to indemnify themselves in case their buildings
are destroyed by fire. A property owner who burns his insured building is
gambling that he will be able to collect under his policy rather than be
found guilty of arson. Similarly, a person who deliberately harms a third
party may be gambling that his acts will be covered by his insurance policy
so he does not bear the loss. While arguments can be advanced that the
presence of insurance does not necessarily mean that the number of wrong-
ful acts would increase, the fact that such coverage is available could mean
that persons would be more inclined to behave irresponsibly since they
would not have to bear the financial responsibility for their acts.1
4 2
Courts which interpret the intentional injury exclusionary clause as
ambiguous are also rewriting the policies to provide coverage for an in-
sured's wrongful acts and are imposing on the insurer a nonexistent duty.143
Such interpretations are not only contrary to the tenets of contract law but
also are unwarranted since policies can be written in which insurers assume
450-51, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1975) ("[Public policy recognizes the public benefit from lia-
bility insurance and yet dictates that a person should not be permitted to insure against harms
he may intentionally and unlawfully cause others, and thereby acquire a license to engage in
such activity.")
140. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1252. Farbstein & Stillman present an in-
teresting commentary on the number of liability claims based on "auto bump" suits and the
relation between the number of such cases and the availability of insurance. Id. at 1251-52.
141. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1251-52.
142. Courts are split on whether conviction for a criminal act automatically demon-
strates that the insured intended to harm a third party. Courts in Georgia, Montana, and
Wisconsin, where the intentional injury exclusionary clause is held to be free from ambiguity,
and in Indiana, which holds the clause is ambiguous, have ruled that a criminal conviction
cannot be used to prove in a separate tort claim that the insured intended to harm the third
party. Among the reasons given by the courts for their ruling was that conviction in a criminal
case does not establish any of the elements of a civil case. See Continental Casualty Co. v.
Parker, 161 Ga. App. 614, 288 S.E.2d 776 (1982); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v.
Phalen, 182 Mont. 448. 597 P.2d 720 (1979); Poston v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee
Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 320 N.W.2d 9 (1982); and Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984). However, in North Carolina, where the intentional injury exclusionary clause is
held to be free from ambiguity, courts have allowed a criminal conviction to be used to prove
the intent of the insured. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. 461, 303
S.E.2d 214 (1983). For a more detailed discussion, see Annotation, Criminal Conviction as
Rendering Conduct for which Insured Convicted Within Provision of Liability Insurance Pol-
icy Expressly Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended or Expected by Insured, 35
A.L.R. 4th 1063 (1985).
143. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at § 4685.01.
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duties to third parties and which cover intentional torts. " In short, the
courts do not need to do what the contracting parties can do for themselves.
However, such contracts might not be valid since they would allow the in-
sured to "freely contract away the consequences of his own wrongdoing." '14 5
Courts could view the insured's efforts to protect himself from the conse-
quences of his own intentional wrongful acts as contrary to public policy
and declare the agreements illegal and void.
146
Another effect of a court ruling which holds the intentional injury ex-
clusionary clause to be ambiguous is an undermining of the doctrine of pu-
nitive damages. 14 7 Seven reasons have been given for assessing punitive
damages: punishing the defendant, deterring the defendant from repeating
the offense, deterring others from committing an offense, preserving the
peace, inducing private law enforcement, compensating victims for other-
wise uncompensable losses, and paying the plaintiff's attorney fees.' 48 Of
these, the two most widely recognized purposes are to punish and to de-
ter. 1 49 Redressing the injury is not a purpose of punitive damages.' 50 The
doctrine is weakened if, through an interpretation of the exclusionary clause
as ambiguous, punitive damages assessed to the insured in a tort action can
be passed on to the insurer.
Insureds would thus be able to commit intentional wrongful acts with-
out bearing the responsibility for those acts through the payment of puni-
tive damages, as they now can avoid responsibility when courts order insur-
ers to pay actual damages. In Gray v. Zurich, the insured was found guilty
of assault in a tort action.' His insurer refused to defend, claiming the act
144. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1238.
145. Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58 ILL.
B.J. 780, 789 (1970).
146. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 174 (1964).
147. See generally K. REDDEN, supra note 46, at §§ 2.1-.9. Punitive damages, Redden
notes, are also known as vindictive or exemplary damages or "smart money" and are awarded
to plaintiffs who "prove themselves victims of a willful, wanton, reckless, malicious, oppressive
or brutal act .... Their goal is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from similar
conduct." Id. at § 2.1. The state has an interest in punitive damages because they provide
private incentive to redress wrongs when the state is not in a position to address the grievance.
King, supra note 8, at 345. After stating a cause of action in his complaint, the plaintiff first
asks for nominal or compensatory damages; he then must ask specifically for punitive dam-
ages. K. REDDEN, supra note 46, at § 3.1. Punitive damages can be recovered in a majority of
the jurisdictions; however, punitive damages may not be recovered, or may be recovered only
when authorized by statute, in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, and Wash-
ington. M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §
400.00 (1985).
148. Ellis, supra note 8, at 3.
149. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS L.Q. 241, 249
(1985).
150. Id.
151. 65 Cal. 3d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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was intentional and was within the scope of the exclusionary clause.'52 The
insured then brought suit against the insurer for failure to defend.'"3 The
court ruled that the exclusionary clause was ambiguous. 54 It ordered the
insurer to pay actual damages assessed against the insured in the tort ac-
tion. 155 Similarly, in American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, a thirteen-year-old boy
threw a bottle into a wading pool where several small children were playing,
hitting one of them on the head.'56 The court ruled that although the act
was intentional, the injury was not.1 67 The court held that the exclusionary
clause was ambiguous and that the insurer was liable for actual damages. 58
Using similar reasoning, the court in Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brandum ruled that an insurance company was liable for injuries to various
third parties, even though the insured deliberately rammed the vehicle in
which they were riding with his car.159 In each case, actual damages were
paid by the insurer for the intentional wrongful acts of the insured.
Courts that order insurers to pay actual damages do not agree on
whether liability insurers should pay punitive damages awarded against
their insureds.' 60 This disagreement stems from the basic conflict between
the concept of punitive damages, which seeks to punish wrongdoers through
economic loss, and liability insurance, which seeks to indemnify the insured
against judgments rendered against him."6 ' Consequently, American juris-
dictions have divided about equally on whether liability for punitive dam-
ages may be "shifted" to an insurer.1 62
When deciding whether an insurance policy covers an award of puni-
tive damages, courts make a two-level inquiry.1 63 First, they determine
whether the terms of the policy can be reasonably interpreted to cover puni-
tive damages; if so, they determine whether such coverage is precluded by
public policy.'" The language of the policy usually resolves the first is-
sue.'65 If the court finds that the insurer did not contract to indemnify the
insured for a particular claim, coverage is precluded.' 66 But if the langauge





156. 242 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D. Conn 1965).
157. Id. at 260.
158. Id. at 260-61.
159. 419 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
160. Kelly, supra note 24, at 487.
161. Kelly, supra note 24, at 496.
162. Grass, supra note 149, at 283.
163. Minzer, supra note 147, at § 40.90.
164. Minzer, supra note 147, at § 40.90.
165. King, supra note 8, at 358.
166. Minzer, supra note 147, at § 40.92[2].
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injury exclusionary clause, courts will rule either that coverage is not al-
lowed, because coverage is limited to fortuitous losses, or that coverage is
allowed under the doctrine of contra proferentum.16 7
Courts generally look to two areas when deciding if the langauge of the
policy precludes punitive damages.'6 8 They first look to the language which
states that the insurance company agrees to "pay all sums which the in-
sured shall be obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury .. .
sustained by any person." 169 The majority of courts hold that this general
insuring language includes coverage for punitive damages.' 70 Second, the
courts look to whether punitive damages were specifically excluded from
policy coverage.' 71 If punitive damages are not specifically excluded, some
courts reason that coverage must be included.' 72 Since coverage is not ex-
cluded, the courts reason that it would be unjust to allow the insurance
company to refuse to cover an "unsuspecting and uninformed" insured who
assumes that he is covered. 7 However, since few policies expressly exclude
punitive damages, only a few cases have held that punitive damages are not
covered. ' 7'
If, after completing the first level of inquiry, the court finds that the
policy language does not preclude punitive damages, the court then decides
whether punitive damages are precluded from coverage as a matter of pub-
lic policy.' 75 A number of jurisdictions, 176 but still a minority, 77 have held
that liability policies preclude punitive damages as a matter of public pol-
icy. 178  They reason that the primary purpose of punitive dam-
ages-punishment-would be defeated by allowing an insurance policy to
protect against such damages. 7 But the majority of jurisdictions holds that
167. King, supra note 8, at 359. See the doctrine of contra proferentum, supra note 112.
168. Generally, punitive damages are not awarded in contract actions. However, if the
breach constitutes or is accompanied by an independent or wanton tort, punitive damages are
available. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 30, § 14-3.
169. For examples of standard policies see R. KEETON, supra note 1, at apps. E-H.
170. Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 8
(1978).
171. The insurance industry through its Insurance Service Office attempted in recent
years to insert in its liability policies an exclusion that would have removed coverage for puni-
tive damages. The proposal was withdrawn because of objections of agents who disagreed with
the broad wording of the clause and of a number of state insurance departments which refused
to permit such an exclusion. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 45, at § 16.06[21.
172. P. MAGARICK, supra note 45, at 517.
173. Kelly, supra note 24, at 517.
174. Kelly, supra note 24, at 499.
175. Burrell & Young, supra note 170, at 8.
176. Minzer, supra note 147, at § 40.92[2).
177. Kelly, supra note 24, at 508.
178. Kelly, supra note 24, at 508.
179. Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REV. 573,
577-78 (1964).
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because of the broad langauge of the policies and because of the expecta-
tions of the insured, liability policies should cover punitive damages.' 80
The effectiveness of punitive damages lies in the economic principle
that the frequency of an activity decreases as its cost increases.' 8' If the
insured can shift the burden of liability through insurance, the wrongdoer
will go unpunished, 82 and he will no longer be personally responsible for his
conduct.' 83 The award would be determined not by the magnitude of the
offense but by the amount of the insurance. 84 The punishment would ulti-
mately fall on the consumer, 85 with the loss passed on to other policyhold-
ers through higher premiums. 80 Since no deterrent effect is served by as-
sessing punitive damages against the insurer for the intentional
wrongdoings of the insured, the shift of the burden of financial responsibil-
ity from the insured results in a definitional shift of the compensation paid
by the insurer. Punitive damages become compensatory damages. Punitive
damages are generally recognized as having compensatory aspects, 87 and
their frequent after-tax effect is to compensate the plaintiff' 88 to windfall
proportions since he has already received an award for actual damages. 89
Thus, to maintain the goals of deterrence and punishment inherent in the
doctrine of punitive damages, courts should refrain from interpreting the
intentional injury exclusionary clause as ambiguous.
GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETATION OF AN INTENTIONAL INJURY
EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE
Interpretation of the intentional injury exclusionary clause as ambigu-
ous has a three-fold effect: increasing litigation and compensation, contra-
vening general rules of contract law, and undermining the doctrine of puni-
tive damages. These conclusions seem simple. Yet, when litigants become
involved, the issues become more complex. Hence, guidelines to assist the
courts in applying an intentional injury exclusionary clause are needed.
Contract law provides a starting place for the development of such
180. Kelly, supra note 29, at 417.
181. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 4, at 1245.
182. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982).
183. King, supra note 8, at 351.
184. Grass, supra note 149, at 284.
185. Grass, supra note 149, at 284.
186. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 74 (1982).
187. Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 DICK. L. REV. 221, 234
(1980).
188. King, supra note 8, at 362.
189. Christovich, Spare the Rod, 49 INS. COUNS. J. 4 (1982).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1987], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/6
EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES
guidelines. Courts are prohibited from rewriting contracts. The rationale for
this policy is clear; presumably, under ideal situations, parties in relatively
equal positions have bargained with each other until they reached agree-
ment. However, if the parties are not in equal bargaining positions, the
courts will generally assist the weaker party. Thus, when litigation involves
a contract of adhesion, such as an insurance policy, any ambiguities will be
construed against the stronger party who provided the contract and in favor
of the weaker party.' 90 The result is that while courts may not rewrite a
contract, they do, in actuality, have the authority to alter the terms to some
extent, i.e., rewrite the contract.
The question then becomes determining when the court crosses the line
between permissible clarification of ambiguities and impermissible rewriting
of the contract, and, more importantly, its incentive in doing so. Courts are
fully aware of the basic dispute in insurance claims. Through all the argu-
ments about intent and language, the court perceives that the underlying
question is "who pays."19' The court also knows that it must provide an
answer. Interpreting the intentional injury exclusionary clause as ambigu-
ous gives the court more leeway in reaching its decision. The court sees
before it a person injured through no fault of his own, a person seeking
compensation for injury done to him. Thus, the court may use an interpre-
tation of the intentional injury exclusionary clause as ambiguous to change
the question it must resolve. "Who pays" with its possible answer of a judg-
ment-proof insured becomes "who can pay." Then, the answer is the in-
surer, the party with the deep pocket.
The need for guidelines for courts to use when applying the intentional
injury exclusionary clause thus becomes apparent. Without such guidelines,
courts, ruling that the exclusionary clause is ambiguous, contravene the
general rules of contract law and punitive damages. With such guidelines,
the courts can answer the "who pays" question in a manner consistent with
those doctrines.
The first step the courts should take is not to view conflicts of interest
between the insured and the insurer as a basis for ruling the intentional
injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous. Application of the exclusionary
clause results in an almost automatic conflict of interest between the insurer
and the insured. The insured benefits from a finding of negligence which
could fall within the coverage of the policy. 92 The insurer favors a finding
of an intentional tort, which would not be covered by the policy.' 98 In
Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., the court regarded the competing provi-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
192. Snodgrass v. Baize, 405 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
193. Id.
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sions of the policy pertaining to the duty to defend as resulting in an ambi-
guity.' " The court described the policy provision and the exclusionary
clause as being "at odds" and resolved its doubts in favor of the insured. 9 "
Thus, one conflict leading to a ruling of ambiguity can be found in the duty
to defend.
A second conflict between the insurer and the insured can arise in the
duty to pay which is separate from the duty to defend. 196 Courts have found
a conflict between the clause obligating the insurer to pay those sums which
the insured is obligated to pay as damages and the exclusionary clause.' 9 7
The courts have viewed both provisions as ambiguous because of a per-
ceived conflict in the duty to pay.'9 8
Courts should not resolve conflicts between the insured and the insurer
by holding that the intentional injury exclusionary clause is ambiguous. In-
stead, either the insured or the insurer can resolve the conflict by filing a
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of rights and duties under the
policy.' 99 The declaratory judgment is a binding adjudication of the rights
and status of the litigants.200 In insurance disputes, the declaratory judg-
ment is generally used to determine whether the insurer has a duty to de-
fend the insured.20' Arguably, that duty may involve a determination of
whether the insured's acts fall within the scope of an exclusionary clause.
But before it can rule, the court must consider whether the insured's acts
were intentional and whether the occurrence was accidental. If the court
proceeds without a declaratory judgment, simply reasoning that because of
a conflict of interest the exclusionary clause is ambiguous, the court has
eliminated the need to examine the rationale for its ruling. A conflict of
interest between the insurer and the insured is not indicative of ambiguity
per se, but instead reflects a dispute about the application of the clause, a
dispute best resolved with a declaratory judgment which clearly defines the
rights of the litigants.
Courts should also adopt a definition of intent patterned after that for-
mulated in the Restatement of Torts and Prosser: a desire to cause the
consequence and a belief that those consequences are likely to follow from
the insured's acts.2 0 2 This definition, or variations of it, is used in those
194. 81 Mich. App. at 67, 264 N.W.2d at 124.
195, Id. at 69, 264 N.W.2d at 124.
196. Id. at 67, 264 N.W.2d at 123-24.
197. Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 15 A.D.2d 526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738
(1961).
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
200. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (5th ed. 1979).
201. See supra note 46.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
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jurisdictions which view the intentional injury exclusionary clause as free
from ambiguity. 03 Its use allows the courts to take a common-sense ap-
proach to situations in which the insurer and the insured disagree. When
courts apply this definition, the meaning of the exclusionary clause is not
ambiguous. The clause means what a careful reading suggests it means: an
insured cannot expect his insurance policy to cover his own intentional torts.
A clear definition of intent would lead courts to rule that the exclusionary
clause is free from ambiguity.
If the parties to the litigation were to expand the use of the declaratory
judgment in resolving whether the intentional injury exclusionary clause is
ambiguous and, consequently, whether the insured has a duty to defend,
and if the courts were to use a more specific definition of intent, courts
would have less difficulty in determining whether an insured's acts fall
within the scope of the exclusionary clause. Defining the exclusionary
clause as ambiguous has in some instances allowed an injured third party to
be compensated when perhaps otherwise he would not have been. But the
innocent victim's compensation has come at the expense of the doctrines of
contract law and of punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
"Who pays" is a question which does indeed concern the insurer, the
insured, and an injured third person in an insurance claim. Their stakes are
obvious. But another party also has something at stake. That party is the
court. Its concern is what is just and lawful.
Interpretation of the intentional injury exclusionary clause as free from
ambiguity assists the court by keeping decisions consistent with the doc-
trines of contract law and of punitive damages. The "who pays" question is
then answered not on the basis of who has the "deep pocket," but who has
a legal duty.
The decision to hold an insurer liable for the intentional acts of its
insured should be made on the basis of a duty established by the terms of
the contract as they reflect the reasonable expectations of the insured. An
insured, who commits an intentional wrongful act which results in harm to
a third party should not be able to pass the responsibility of his wrongful
act to his insurer. Interpretation of the intentional injury exclusionary
clause as free from ambiguity, along with judicial procedure to resolve con-
flicts and a clear definition of intent, will result in a fair answer to the "who
pays" question.
LINDA J. KIBLER
203. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
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